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Abstract: The contemporary human rights movement holds up 
Nuremberg as a template with which to define responsibility for 
mass violence. The “lesson of Nuremberg” is that state orders 
cannot absolve officials of individual responsibility. I argue that 
the negotiations that ended apartheid — known as the Conven-
tion for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) — provide us with 
the raw material for a critique of these all-embracing claims. I 
also distinguish CODESA from the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (TRC), whose significance has been exaggerated in the 
same proportion as that of CODESA has been belittled. The TRC, 
I argue, shared with Nuremberg a focus on political violence as 
crime. Whereas Nuremberg shaped a notion of justice as crim-
inal justice, CODESA calls on us to think of justice as primarily 
political. Whereas Nuremberg has become the basis of a notion 
of victims’ justice — as a complement rather than an alternative 
to victors’ justice — CODESA provides the basis for an alternative 
notion of justice, which I call survivors’ justice. CODESA shed the 
zero-sum logic of criminal justice for the inclusive nature of po-
litical justice. If Nuremberg has been ideologized as a paradigm, 
the end of apartheid has been exceptionalized as an improba-
ble outcome produced by the exceptional personality of Nelson 
Mandela. It is thus said that Africa’s problems — the violence of 
civil wars — is a result of a culture of impunity among African 
leaders, one that calls for punishment rather than political re-
form. This essay argues for the core relevance of the South Afri-
can transition for ending civil wars in the rest of Africa.
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Beyond Nuremberg: 
The Historical Significance 
of the Post-Apartheid Transition 
in South Africa
Mahmood Mamdani  Makerere Institute of Social Research
A dominant tendency in the contemporary human rights movement holds 
up Nuremberg as a template with which to define responsibility for mass 
violence. This same tendency tends to narrow the meaning of justice to 
criminal justice, thereby individualizing the notion of justice in neo-liberal 
fashion.
Beginning the late 1970s, Nuremberg was ideologized by a human 
rights movement that moved away from a call for structural reform to ac-
cent individual criminal responsibility. More recently, this same movement 
has tended to exceptionalize the South African transition from apartheid 
by center-staging the process known as ‘truth and reconciliation’ and side-
lining the political process that led to the larger agreement of which the 
decision to constitute a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was but one 
part. I suggest a critical appreciation of the post-apartheid transition in 
South Africa, one that focuses on the political process known as Conven-
tion for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), both to rethink the centrality 
of and to suggest a move beyond the logic of Nuremberg.
The human rights movement that gathered steam in the late 1970s 
anchored itself ideologically in the lessons of the Holocaust and presented 
itself as a post-Nuremberg movement. What connected this movement of 
the 1970s and beyond to Nuremberg was less historical chronology than its 
apolitical thrust. Samuel Moyn has argued that human rights were “born 
as an alternative to grand political mission,” as “a moral criticism of poli-
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tics.” In this essay, I will seek to connect the moral and the political, the 
ethical and the historical, through a discussion of two responses to crimes 
against humanity: the criminal trials known as Nuremberg and the Con-
vention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), the political talks that led 
to the end of apartheid.
The contemporary human rights movement anchors itself ideolog-
ically in the lessons of defeat, not of revolution — the lessons of the Nazi 
Holocaust, not the French Revolution. Whereas the movement organized 
around the revolutionary banner — Rights of Man — was highly political, the 
contemporary human rights movement is consciously anti-political, which 
is the meaning it gives to the notion of “human” and “humanitarian”. 
Nuremberg is said to redefine the problem and the solution. The problem 
is extreme violence — radical evil — and the question it poses is responsibil-
ity for the violence. The solution encapsulated as “lessons of Nuremberg”, 
is to think of violence as criminal, and of responsibility for it as individu-
al — state orders cannot absolve officials of individual responsibility. Above 
all, this responsibility is said to be ethical, not political.
Could one argue that the lesson of the transition from apartheid is 
the opposite? Should extreme violence be thought of more as political than 
criminal? I was part of the audience one grey morning in Cape Town when 
the TRC questioned F W de Klerk. De Klerk had read out a statement enu-
merating the wrongs of apartheid and concluded by taking responsibility 
for apartheid. But the TRC was not interested. Its interest was narrowly fo-
cused: on specific human rights violations such as murder, torture, kidnap-
ping: did de Klerk know of these? Had he authorized any of these? It struck 
me how different this was from what I had read of Nuremberg. At Nurem-
berg, the greatest responsibility lay with those in positions of power, those 
who had planned and strategized, not those with boots on the ground. At 
the TRC, the responsibility lay with the one who pulled the trigger. The 
greatest responsibility seemed to lie with the one closest to the scene of 
the crime. Why was the leadership of apartheid not held responsible for it? The 
answer is political, not ethical.
The negotiations that ended apartheid provide us with raw materi-
al for a critique of universalist claims made by the current human rights 
movement. To reflect on the lessons of apartheid, we need to begin with two 
questions: how shall we think of extreme violence, of mass violence — as 
criminal or political? And how shall we define responsibility for large scale 
violence — as criminal or political? I will suggest that the present rush for 
courtroom solutions advocated by the human rights community is the re-
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sult of a double failure: analytical and political. Analytically, it confuses po-
litical with criminal violence. Politically, the focus on perpetrators is at the 
expense of a focus on the issues that drive the violence. As such it is likely 
to magnify rather than mitigate violence in the public sphere.
What distinguishes political from criminal violence? The key distinc-
tion is qualitative. Political violence requires more than just criminal agen-
cy; it needs a political constituency. More than just perpetrators, it needs 
supporters. That constituency, in turn, is held together and mobilized by an 
issue. More than criminal violence, political violence is issue-driven.
For a start, I suggest two ways of thinking of political violence, one 
born in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the other in the aftermath 
of apartheid, two great crimes against humanity. We tend to identify the 
first with Nuremberg and the latter with the TRC (Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission), and think of the TRC as a departure from Nuremberg, as 
displacing punishment with forgiveness. Not crime and punishment, but 
crime and forgiveness. I suggest that this is a mistake for a number of rea-
sons. To begin with, the TRC was less an alternative to Nuremberg than an 
attempt at a surrogate Nuremberg. It shared a critical premise with Nurem-
berg, the assumption that all violence is criminal and responsibility for it 
is individual. It is not the TRC but CODESA that provides the real alternative 
to Nuremberg. It is CODESA that signifies the larger political project that 
chartered the terms that ended legal and political apartheid and provided 
the constitutional foundation to forge a post-apartheid political order. The 
TRC followed from CODESA, and not the other way around. Nuremberg and 
CODESA have radically different implications for how we think of human 
wrongs and thus of human rights. Whereas Nuremberg shaped a notion of 
justice as criminal justice, CODESA calls on us to think of justice primarily 
as political justice. Whereas Nuremberg has become the basis of a notion 
of victims’ justice — as a complement rather than an alternative to victors’ jus-
tice — CODESA provides the basis for an alternative notion of justice, which I 
call survivors’ justice.
Nuremberg
Nuremberg was one of two trials at the conclusion of the Second World 
War. The second was the Tokyo trial. Nuremberg was an innovation for 
at least three reasons. The judges at Nuremberg rejected the claim that 
individual officials were not responsible for an “act of state”. Nuremberg 
established the principle of individual responsibility for the violation of hu-
man rights. The judges at Nuremberg also established criminal responsibil-
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ity for these crimes. Finally, Nuremberg stood for a universalism whereby 
“the international community” would “be able to reach back through the 
boundaries of state sovereignty to protect individuals or impose norms,” 
thereby holding these individuals directly accountable to “the internation-
al community.” The “international community”, as Elizabeth Borgwardt 
noted, was a euphemism for “a group of ‘civilized nations’, to which other-
wise sovereign polities were ultimately answerable.”
Nuremberg was born of a debate among victorious powers on how 
they should deal with defeated Nazis. Winston Churchill argued that “Hit-
ler and his gang had forfeited any right to legal procedure” and so should 
be summarily shot. Henry Morganthau, Jr., US Secretary of the Treasury 
and a close friend of Franklin Roosevelt, agreed. Morganthau went further 
and called for a destruction of German industry so Germany would never 
again rise as a power. Henry Stimson, Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, led the 
opposition. Stimson wanted a trial, not just a show trial, but a trial with due 
process. In a speech that is said to have persuaded Truman to appoint him 
the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson had argued only three 
weeks before his appointment: “You must put no man on trial under forms 
of a judicial proceeding if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven 
guilty … the world yields no respect for courts that are organized merely 
to convict.”
Even if based on due process, Nuremberg needs to be understood 
as symbolic and performative. For a start, only the losers were put on tri-
al. The victors appointed not only the prosecutor but the judges too. On 
their part, the accused preferred to be tried by the US than any one else. 
They expected a fairer trial from Americans who, unlike the victims — Jews, 
Russians, French, British — had had the privilege of pavilion seats during 
the war. They also expected softer treatment from the Americans who 
were most likely to be German allies in the brewing Cold War. For official 
America, Nuremberg was an excellent opportunity to inaugurate the new 
world order by showcasing a performance of how a civilized liberal state 
conducts itself. At a time when the air was full of cries for revenge, Rob-
ert Jackson told the audience at Church House in London: “A fair trial for 
every defendant. A competent attorney for every defendant.”
Nuremberg combined elements of both victors’ justice and victims’ 
justice. Victors’ justice followed from the outcome of the war: victorious 
powers established a rule of law under which alleged perpetrators were 
tried. The notion that justice would follow victory was not new. It followed 
a long established tradition of how we think of justice in the aftermath 
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of victory, be that victory the result of war between states or revolution 
between classes or a civil war of a different type. In every case, the assump-
tion is that once the conflict has ended, there is a clear victor under whose 
power justice can be administered. This overall frame marks Nuremberg as 
a model for victors’ justice.
The accused at Nuremberg were charged with four crimes: 1. Con-
spiracy to wage aggressive war. 2. Waging aggressive war. (The counts 1 and 
2 were together called Crimes against Peace). 3. War Crimes (violations of 
the rules and customs of war, such as mistreatment of prisoners of war and 
abuse of enemy civilians). 4. Crimes against Humanity (includes the tor-
ture and slaughter of millions on racial grounds). Striking about this list is 
the fact that conspiracy to wage war and its actual waging were defined as 
the principal crimes (1 and 2) whereas genocide and mass slaughter came 
last in this series of four crimes.
The Allies were divided on this order. The French disagreed that 
waging war was a crime in law; it is what states did. At the Tokyo trial, 
which took twice as long, partly because of long and substantial dissenting 
opinions, Justice Radhabinod Pal of India argued that the charge of crime 
against peace (both 1 and 2) was a case of ex post facto legislation which 
“served only to protect an unjust international order, if there were no other 
workable provisions for peaceful adjustment of the status quo.” Much later, 
in 1992, Telford Taylor, who had replaced Jackson as the Chief Prosecutor 
in the twelve remaining US-conducted trials in Germany, and who then 
had a distinguished career as professor of law at Columbia Law School, 
conceded that the court’s judgment on counts 1 and 2 did indeed rely on ex 
post facto law.
An even more serious problem arose from the fact that the victors’ 
court was not likely to put the victors on trial. Would not Truman’s order 
to firebomb Tokyo and the drop atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
leading to untold civilian deaths at a time when the war was already end-
ing, qualify as “gratuitous human suffering” and a “crime against humani-
ty,” to use the language of the court? Had not Winston Churchill committed 
a “crime against humanity” when he ordered the bombing of residential, 
working class, sections of German cities, particularly Dresden, in the last 
months of the war? Most agreed that the British policy of terror bombing 
of civilian areas killed some 300,000 and seriously injured another 780,000 
German civilians.
Nuremberg is also identified with victims’ justice, often thought of as 
an alternative to victor’s justice, but in fact a complement to it. One of the 
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charges against the accused was that they had committed “crimes against 
humanity.” The charge was first formulated in 1890 by George Washington 
Williams, a historian, a Baptist minister, a lawyer, and the first black mem-
ber of the Ohio state legislature, in a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State in 
which he documented atrocities committed by King Leopold’s colonial re-
gime in Congo, concluding that this was a “crime against humanity.” I have 
already pointed out that crime against humanity was last of the four charg-
es against the accused at Nuremberg. As the trial proceeded, the emphasis 
on victims’ justice began to diminish. The reason was political: as the Cold 
War developed, US policy towards Germany moved from a demand for jus-
tice to a call for accenting accommodation over punishment. The effect 
was most evident in the trial of Alfred Krupp, the leading German industri-
al magnate. The Krupp family had been manufacturers of steel since early 
nineteenth century and Europe’s leading manufacturers and suppliers of 
guns and munitions by the First World War. They had armed Germany in 
three major wars. During World War II Krupp managed 138 concentration 
camps. Ranged throughout Europe, all were privately owned by Krupp. 
Alfred Krupps used slave labor from the camps and prisoners of war to 
build his factories and provided Hitler’s wars with money and weapons, 
as combination of investment and commitment. One of those charged at 
Nuremberg, Krupp was released in 1951, his fortune restored. There was 
little justice for victims at Nuremberg. When it came, it was political and it 
was obtained outside the court.
To understand the particular form that victims’ justice took, we need 
to appreciate the political context that framed Nuremberg. Nuremberg 
functioned as part of a larger political logic shared by the victorious Allied 
powers. This was that winners and losers, victims and perpetrators, must be 
physically separated into different political communities. As they redrew 
boundaries and transferred millions across borders, Allied Powers carried 
out or sanctioned the most extreme ethnic cleansing in modern history. By 
1950, between 12 and 14 million Germans had fled or were expelled from 
east-central Europe. Historians consider this the largest forcible movement 
of any population in modern Europe history. This, in turn, was part of a 
larger forced transfer of populations from Central and Eastern Europe, es-
timated at more than 20 million. German federal agencies and the Ger-
man Red Cross estimate that between 2 and 2.5 million civilians died in the 
course of expulsions. Some writers have described this forced movement 
of populations as ‘population transfer,’ others as ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and yet 
others as ‘genocide.’
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The possibility of victims’ justice flowed from the assumption that 
there would be no need for winners and losers to live together after victo-
ry. Perpetrators would remain in Germany and victims would depart for 
another homeland. Yesterday’s perpetrators and victims will not have to 
live together, for there will be a separate state — Israel — for survivors. The 
process culminated in the period after Nuremberg with the creation of the 
State of Israel, seen as a state for victims. Indeed, post-Holocaust language 
reserves the identity ‘survivors’ only for yesterday’s victims. As in Israel, 
this is also the case in contemporary Rwanda. In both cases, the state gov-
erns in the name of victims.
The transition from apartheid
The post-apartheid transition in South Africa is popularly identified with 
the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC]. This work is 
presumed to have been guided by the dictum that perpetrators be forgiven 
past crimes in return for acknowledging the past [truth]. It is said that the 
TRC created a new precedent: immunity from prosecution [some may say, 
impunity] in return for acknowledging the truth, forgiveness in return for 
an honest confession. In a few words: Forgive, but not forget. This claim is 
central to the contemporary ideologization of the TRC.
I shall discuss the TRC in greater detail in a later section, but it should 
suffice to point out here the problem with this widely accepted notion: it is 
not quite true. Key to the post-apartheid transition was not an exchange of 
amnesty for truth, but amnesty for the willingness to reform. That reform 
was the dismantling of juridical and political apartheid. The real break-
through represented by the South African case is not contained in the TRC 
but in the talks that preceded it, CODESA, that have so far been dismissed as 
nothing but hard-nosed pragmatism.
The ground for CODESA was prepared by a double acknowledgement 
by both sides to the conflict. To begin with, both recognized that there was 
little prospect of ending the conflict in the short run. For far-sighted lead-
ers, this was equivalent to a recognition that their preferred option was 
no longer within reach: neither revolution (for liberation movements) nor 
military victory (for the apartheid regime) was on the cards. If South Africa 
is a model for solving intractable conflicts, it is an argument for moving 
from the best to the second best alternative. That second best alternative 
was political reform. The quest for reform, for an alternative short of vic-
tory, led to the realization that if you threaten to put the leadership on ei-
ther side in the dock they will have no interest in reform. This change in 
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perspective led to a shift, away from criminalizing or demonizing the other 
side to treating it as a political adversary. Its consequence was to displace 
the paradigm of criminal justice identified with Nuremberg.
I suggest that we think of CODESA less as an alternative to Nuremberg 
than as a response to a different set of circumstances. As such, it is also 
a statement that Nuremberg cannot be turned into a universally applica-
ble formula. CODESA was born of the realization that the conditions that 
obtained in apartheid South Africa were different from those that led to 
Nuremberg. The difference was two-fold. First, whereas Nuremberg fol-
lowed a military victory, the conflict in South Africa had not ended. How 
do you stop a conflict that has not ended? How do you convince adversar-
ies that it is in
their interest to stop an ongoing conflict? Surely, this could not be 
done by prioritizing criminal justice and threatening to take the political 
leadership on either side — the apartheid state or the anti-apartheid move-
ment — to court, because the people you would want to take to court are the 
very people you would need to stop the
conflict. Second, whereas Nuremberg was informed by a larger logic 
that drove the post-war settlement, that of ethnic cleansing, one that called 
for a physical separation of yesterday’s victims and yesterday’s perpetrators 
into separate political communities, in South Africa there was no question 
of creating an Israel for victims of apartheid. Instead, it was clear that vic-
tims and perpetrators, blacks and whites, would have to live in the same 
country.
Rather than put justice in the back seat, CODESA presents us with a 
radically new way of thinking about justice. It presents us with a double 
breakthrough. To begin with, CODESA distinguished between different 
forms of justice — criminal, political and social. It prioritized political jus-
tice, the reform of the political system, over the other two. The difference 
between political and criminal justice is two-fold. One, political justice af-
fects groups whereas criminal justice targets individuals. Two, the object of 
criminal justice is punishment, that of political justice is political reform. 
A shift of logic from the criminal to the political led to decriminalizing 
and legitimizing both sides to the conflict. The liberation movements — the 
ANC, the PAC and the Communist Party — were all unbanned. The apart-
heid regime, the National Party and the highly secretive underground net-
work known as the Broederbond, also ceased to be treated as pariah by 
anti-apartheid activists. In de-criminalizing and legitimizing opponents, 
CODESA turned enemies into political adversaries. In the process, CODESA 
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also changed the goal post. The goal was no longer the internment and 
punishment of individuals charged with so many crimes, but a change of 
rules that would include them and their constituencies into a reformed po-
litical community CODESA’s achievement was to bring adversaries to agree 
on a political reform which dismantled legal and political apartheid and 
redefined an inclusive citizenship.
The full impact of this change in perspective was no less than a shift 
of paradigmatic significance. Whereas Nuremberg was backward-looking, 
preoccupied with justice as punishment, CODESA sought a balance between 
the past and the future, between redress for the past and reconciliation 
for the future. The paradigm shifted from one of victims’ justice to that of 
survivors’ justice — where the meaning of survivors changed to include all 
those who had survived apartheid: yesterday’s victims, yesterday’s perpe-
trators and yesterday’s beneficiaries [presumed to be bystanders], all were 
treated as ‘survivors’.
CODESA
The political reform defined the challenge faced by the negotiators at 
CODESA: to forge a transition from a white minority regime to a government 
elected by an enfranchized population. As an interim measure, the parties 
to the negotiation agreed to lay down a set of Constitutional Principles that 
would define the parameters of the Interim Constitution. The Declaration 
of Intent stated: “South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial and 
non-sexist state in which sovereign authority is exercized over the whole of 
its territory.” The Declaration not withstanding, the negotiations at CODESA 
were testimony to so much horse-trading, with each side strengthening its 
negotiating hand using a variety of means, including violence, outside the 
negotiating chambers.
CODESA assembled in December 1991 and broke up in May, 1992. Dur-
ing that period, each side tried to muster a consensus and, failing that, a 
clear majority within its ranks. In the tussle of political wills that ensued, 
both sides employed an array of resources, from mass mobilization to 
targeted violence. When the ultra-right white Conservative Party won a 
by-election in Potchestrom after the start of CODESA, the National Party 
government called for a whites-only referendum in March, 1992. The gov-
ernment interpreted that victory as a mandate from the white population 
to continue to negotiate a political end to apartheid. The ANC responded to 
the ‘Whites only’ referendum with ‘rolling mass action’ in May and a mass 
stayaway on June 12, which turned out to be a massive withholding of labor. 
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Both mobilized in the face of political violence and the threat of more. 
Thus, when police responded to the June 12 stayaway with the massacre at 
Bapoteng, COSATU led yet another stayaway, that on 3 August, and the ANC 
organized the 7 September march on Ciskei.
Sporadic violence triggered heightened mobilization, in turn under-
lining the urgency of further negotiations. The two sides came together to 
draft a Record of Understanding on 26 September 1992. The agreement 
stipulated that a democratically elected assembly would draft the final 
constitution but within a fixed time frame and within the framework of 
constitutional principles agreed upon by a meeting of negotiators appoint-
ed by all parties, but in reality driven by the principals: the NP and the ANC.
The ANC cleared the ground for agreement with historic concessions, 
famously known as the “sunset clauses.” Floated by the Secretary Gener-
al of the Communist Party, Joe Slovo, in an article in the party journal, 
The African Communist, these undoubtedly represented a consensus posi-
tion shared by the leaderships of both the South African Communist Party 
and the ANC. The Sunset Clauses called for power-sharing between the 
two sides, retention of the old bureaucracy (and presumably other organs 
of the state: police, military and the intelligence services) and, finally, a 
general amnesty in return for full disclosure. The different elements that 
comprised the ‘sunset clauses’ — such as the introduction of a political de-
mocracy but a retention of all other structures of the apartheid state, and 
an amnesty in return for full disclosure — had been in the air for some time, 
but this was the first time they were presented as parts of a single package.
Much has been written on the amnesty component of the proposal 
which came to inform the work of the TRC. In a brilliant study on the ge-
nealogy of the TRC, Adam Sitze has argued for the need to locate both the 
idea and the provisions of amnesty in the colonial history of South Afri-
ca, in particular the practice of granting state indemnity following periods 
of martial law and brutal suppression of popular protest. Spitz offers this 
approach as an explicit alternative to the approach that has come to be 
favored by the Transitional Justice industry, connecting the establishment 
of the TRC with influences ranging from Nuremberg-style prosecutions to 
Latin American-style blanket amnesties. Instead, Sitze calls for locating 
both the TRC and prior state-sponsored indemnities in the larger history of 
anti-colonial protest and colonial repression.
Following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and the suppression of 
the Soweto Uprising of 1976, the South African parliament “passed ex-
tremely wide indemnity acts that protected not only South African police 
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officers but also a large number of state officials for prosecution for the 
civil and criminal wrongs they inflicted” during these times. As a result, 
“SADF members were already indemnified in advance for any illegal acts 
they might commit in honest and good faith service to the public good.” 
This already existing protection from prosecution was “widened even more 
by the indemnity acts passed by the South African Parliament in 1990 and 
1992.” Even though the Sharpeville Massacre (1960) and the Soweto Upris-
ing (1976) “fell within the TRC’s juridical and investigative mandate,” Spitz 
argues that the indemnity provisions of the [1957] Defence Act, in combi-
nation with the specific indemnity acts passed in 1961 and 1977, decreased 
or even nullified the power of the TRC’s ‘carrots and sticks’ approach.” To 
put it bluntly, “it is unclear why any state official, member of the SADF or 
officer of the South African Police would feel obliged to run the risk of 
trading truth for amnesty when he or she was already expressly protected 
from prosecution by prior indemnity resolution.” Indeed, “the South Afri-
can Defence Force chose to coordinate its contributions to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission by way of a centralized “Nodal Point,” a single 
point, suggesting a clenched Spincter, through which all information is 
meant to pass.”
My purpose here is not to trace the genealogy of the legislation that 
set up the TRC, but to underline its political prerequisite: the simple fact 
was that the establishment of the TRC was not an independent develop-
ment but followed the political agreement arrived at CODESA. Joe Slovo did 
not need to state what was clear to one and all: that the real quid pro quo 
for ‘the sunset clauses’ was the dismantling of juridical and political apart-
heid and the introduction of electoral reforms that would enfranchise the 
majority and pave the way for majority rule. An acceptance of the “sunset 
clauses” would mean that South Africa would not have its own version of 
Nuremberg.
The Multi-Party Negotiating Process began on 5 March at Kempton 
Park but was sluggish. It took another political crisis to generate momen-
tum. That crisis was the assassination of Chris Hani on April 10, 1993. The 
parties agreed on June 1 that elections be held ten months later, on 27 April 
1994. The shared sense that storm clouds were indeed gathering on the ho-
rizon made it possible to truncate discussions, especially on fundamentals 
such as the “constitutional principles” and the constitution itself. Power 
was ceded to technical committees (with further technical assistance from 
the Harvard Negotiation Project), in the name of preventing and breaking 
deadlocks in the negotiations. Agreement was driven forward by a pro-
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ANC and the NP, to meet outside the formal discussion and define agree-
ment on key issues. There was also agreement that the process that led 
to the drafting of Namibia’s 1982 Constitutional Principles, and that gave 
the Interim Constitution a weight more enduring than that of an inter-
im political agreement, be duplicated in South Africa. The combination of 
binding principles agreed upon by unelected negotiators and the adjudi-
cating power of the Constitutional Court, giving it powers to throw out a 
constitution drafted by an elected assembly, was acknowledged by many 
as a blatant curb on majority rule but, at the same time, as necessary to 
attaining that same majority rule.
The constitutional Principles included a number of key provisions. 
The central provision was the inclusion of a Bill of Rights as part of a set 
of constitutional checks and balances. The Bill of Rights included protec-
tion of private property as a fundamental human right. At the same time, 
and without a stated rationale, the clause providing the restoration of land 
to the majority population was placed outside the Bill of Rights. Where 
property rights were in clash, as that of white settlers and black natives, the 
former received constitutional protection, the latter no more than a formal 
acknowledgement in law.
This disparity was reinforced at the local level, through the coming 
together of two political forces that found common ground in the negoti-
ations: white settlers and Native Authorities in Bantustans. For the Native 
Authorities, there was Act 3 of 1994 which gave constitutional recognition 
to the Zulu monarchy, and Schedule 6 which recognized “indigenous and 
customary law.” For the settlers, the prize was the passage of the Local 
Government Transition Act of 1993. The Act entrenched consociational 
government at the local level — in contrast to the national and provincial 
levels. “Local government elections were structured in such a way that they 
precluded black voters from obtaining two-thirds majority on a local gov-
ernment council.” The operative principle was known as the “ward lim-
itation system.” Section 245(3) stipulated that only 40 percent of seats on 
a council be elected by proportional representation. The remaining 60% 
would be elected from ward-based constituencies with the proviso that no 
more than half the seats be drawn from historically black areas. This provi-
sion guaranteed non-blacks 30% of the seats. Section 176(a) required a local 
authority to muster a two-thirds majority to pass its budget. Furthermore, 
Section 177 required that the executive Committee of a local government 
be composed in proportion to party representation on the local govern-
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ment council; even more, it stipulated that all decisions be taken by con-
sensus. Where consensus could not be reached, a two-thirds majority was 
required for executive committee decisions. The combined effect of these 
provisions was that local authorities in former white areas could not take 
any significant decision without the agreement of councilors representing 
its white residents.
Two further measures had the effect of entrenching — not just pro-
tecting — white privilege in small towns. When it came to establishing a 
transitional [town] council in the pre-interim phase, a negotiating forum 
had to get 80% support from its delegates. Because it controlled most of the 
[white] local government councils in the Transvaal and thus the Transvaal 
Municipal Association, consensus decision-making processes fitted in with 
the agenda of the white supremacist Conservative Party. The requirement 
for consensus-based decision-making had the effect of vesting elected rep-
resentative of white residents with an effective veto over local government 
decisions.
The second measure concerned powers of taxation, putting practi-
cally insurmountable legal obstacles in the way of any popular project to 
redistribute income through taxation. Clause 17 required that local govern-
ment taxes and levies had to be based on a uniform structure for its area 
of jurisdiction. This prevented new local governments from taxing white 
areas so they could spend more revenue in black areas. Thus did CODESA 
entrench white privilege, both in the constitution and in the law that estab-
lished the framework for local government.
The TRC
There are two debates in South Africa today. The first focuses on the perpe-
trator, and thus on criminal justice. The second focuses on the beneficiary, 
and thus on social justice. Whereas there is hardly a popular demand in 
contemporary South Africa calling for perpetrators of apartheid to be tried 
and punished, it is the debate around social justice that more and more 
drives the critique of the post-apartheid transition, in particular the down-
playing of social justice in the agreements concluded at CODESA. I have 
a mixed response to this critique. The demand that the end of apartheid 
should have delivered social justice ignores the political reality that defined 
the context in which CODESA was negotiated. The political prerequisite for 
attaining social justice would have been a social revolution, but there was 
no revolution in South Africa. If apartheid was not defeated, neither was it 
victorious. The most one can say is that there was a stalemate. Even if social 
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justice could not have been part of the package negotiated at CODESA, it is 
not unreasonable to expect that it would have figured prominently on the 
agenda for a post-apartheid South Africa. Instead, a lid was put on both leg-
islative endeavors for social justice and narrative attempts to underline its 
necessity. We have already seen that the constitution negotiated at CODE-
SA defended the integrity of property accumulated during the apartheid 
era as part of a constitutionally sanctified Bill of Rights. At the same time, 
the semi-official narrative crafted by the TRC described apartheid not as 
a system in which a racialized power disenfranchised and dispossessed a 
racialized majority, but as a set of human rights violations of a minority of 
individual victims carried out by an even smaller minority of individual 
perpetrators.
Did the beneficiaries of apartheid win at the negotiating table what 
its authors and perpetrators could not win on the battle field? If so, what set 
of political conditions made this possible? The main condition was to play 
off two wings of the anti-apartheid movement, reinforcing the leadership 
of the external wing and sidelining the internal wing. The anti-apartheid 
camp comprised two very different kinds of forces: on the one hand, exiled 
‘liberation movements,’ principally the ANC, whose scanty presence on the 
ground contrasted with its enormous popular prestige; and, on the other, an 
internally organized anti-apartheid resistance which knit together dozens 
of community and shop floor level organisations into a single archetypal 
network, called the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was responsible 
for the stalemate in which apartheid found itself. The ‘sufficient consensus’ 
crafted by the ANC and the NP stretched and strained the relation between 
the exile and the internal wings of the anti-apartheid opposition. In mar-
ginalizing the forces identified with the internal opposition, the sufficient 
consensus’ also sidelined their agenda for social justice. This is, however, 
not the place to elaborate on this political outcome. My purpose here is to 
focus on the double closure — constitutional and narrative — that was the 
result of the political alliance between reform forces within the ruling NP 
and the ANC-based exile wing, the alliance that ushered in the post-apart-
heid transition.
The basic elements of the new constitution were crafted in CODESA, 
whereas the outlines of a narrative for the ‘new’ South Africa were crafted 
by the TRC. In contrast to CODESA, the process guided by the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission (TRC) was designed as a civic educational process. 
The TRC comprised three committees, of which the decisions of only the 
Amnesty Committee had the force of law. The other two committees — the 
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Human Rights Committee and the Reparations (compensation) commit-
tee — functioned in an advisory capacity. Though set up by legislation and 
resourced by the state, the TRC was not subject to control by any state au-
thority. It was free to define its own agenda within the framework of the 
legislation that set it up. This gave it a double freedom: the power to craft a 
semi-official narrative of apartheid; and guaranteed daily access to prime 
time media to communicate this narrative to a wider public.
The legislation that set up the TRC gave it the freedom to define ‘the 
victim’. In interpreting the legislation, the TRC made three key decisions. 
First, the TRC individualized the victim. To do so was to ignore precisely 
what was distinctive about apartheid, that it was a system based on group 
oppression. Secondly, the TRC defined a human rights violation narrowly, as 
violating the “bodily integrity” of an individual. This distinction too proved 
problematic in a context where the vast majority of the population suffered 
violence as extra-economic. The violence of apartheid did not target the 
“bodily integrity” of a population group defined as “Bantu” but their means 
of livelihood, land and labor. Finally, there was the question of defining 
the perpetrator. When it came to measures that directly affected the vast 
majority of the oppressed population, measures such as the forced removal 
of millions from land gazetted as “white areas” or pass laws that tracked the 
movement of all black people, extra-economic coercion was the work of 
apartheid authorities, and not the initiative of individual operatives. Just as 
victims were defined and targeted as racialized groups and not as individ-
uals, perpetrators too were part of a racialized power and did not for the 
most part function as individuals.
The TRC had the legislative freedom to define the victim, whether 
as an individual or a group. Whereas apartheid legislation classified the 
subject population as so many races defined in law — and governed them 
as groups and not as individuals — the TRC remained adamant that victims 
had to be individuals. When it came to “gross violation of human rights,” 
this is how Section 1(1)(ix) of the Act defined its meaning:
…“gross violation of human rights” means the violation of human rights 
through — (a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any per-
son; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or 
procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a), which emanat-
ed from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the period 
1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 within or outside the Republic, and the com-
mission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, 
by any person acting with a political motive. (emphasis mine)
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The debate focused on the meaning of “severe ill-treatment” and the defi-
nition of “political motive.”
In 1959, the apartheid government passed the Promotion of Ban-
tu Self-Government Act. The Act was to provide the legal umbrella for a 
far-reaching ethnic and racial cleansing of 87% of the land that was de-
fined as “white” South Africa. A widely distributed and cited investigation 
by The Surplus People Project documented that 3.5 million had indeed 
been moved forcibly by South African authorities between 1960 and 1982 
as part of the project to create ethnic homelands. The Commission accept-
ed the estimate and acknowledged that the process involved “collective 
expulsions, forced migration, bulldozing, gutting or seizure of homes, the 
mandatory carrying of passes, forced removals into rural ghettos and in-
creased poverty and desperation.” Did these practices constitute “severe 
ill-treatment”? After noting that “forced removals” were “an assault on the 
rights and dignity of millions of South Africans,” the Commission claimed 
it could not acknowledge them since these violations “may not have been 
‘gross’ as defined by the Act.”
The distinction between “bodily integrity rights” and “subsistence 
rights” echoes a familiar distinction in social theory between the realm of 
the political and that of the economic, that of the state and that of the mar-
ket, the former the source of oppressive practices that directly deny rights 
and the latter the source of inequalities that indirectly limit the means to 
exercise these rights. But practices such as coerced labor and forced remov-
als could neither be classified as just economic or political; they were both. 
Where a command economy obtained, the familiar distinction between 
the political and the economic obscured practices where political power 
directly intervenes in the sphere of economic relations. Like slavery, co-
erced labor and forced removals required the direct and continued use of 
force. Neither could be dismissed as structural outcomes lacking in agen-
cy and, therefore, not signifying a violation of civil rights. Rather than an 
outcome of “the dull compulsion of market forces”, to use a formulation of 
Marx, these practices were characteristic of extra-economic forms of co-
ercion. Rather than illuminate the divide between the economic and the 
political, they tended to articulate the relation between the two.
Then there was the question of distinguishing a “political” from a 
“non-political” motive. Were pass laws, the backbone of a legal regime that 
targeted every black South African, political? Were arrests under pass laws 
political? According to estimates made by the South African Institute of 
Race Relations, over a million people had been administratively ordered to 
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leave urban areas by 1972. “From the early sixties,” the Commission noted, 
“the pass laws were the primary instrument used by the state to arrest and 
charge its political opponents.” Indeed, the Commission found that the 
proportion of pass law offenders was “as high as one in every four inmates 
during the 1960s and 1970s.” The Commission accepted that “the treat-
ment of pass law offenders could well be interpreted as a human rights 
violation” but still refused to include the category of pass law prisoners in 
the institutional hearings on prisons. In spite of the fact that “a strong argu-
ment was made for the inclusion of this category of common law prisoners 
in the hearings,” the Commission refused on the grounds that these were 
common law prisoners and not “political prisoners”. Yet, the only “com-
mon law” these prisoners had violated was the pass law, the law that crim-
inalized the exercise of a basic human right, the right of free movement.
Another category that raised questions about how the Commission 
distinguished political from non-political motives was that of farm prisoners. 
The notorious farm prisons system was directly connected to the pass law 
system. Failure by a black person to produce a pass resulted in an arrest. As 
the number of arrests grew, so did the financial burden on the state. The 
Department of Native Affairs proposed a solution in General Circular 23 
of 1954: “It is common knowledge that large numbers of natives are daily 
being arrested for contraventions of a purely technical nature. These ar-
rests cost the state large sums of money and serve no useful purpose. The 
Department of Justice, the South African Police and this Department have 
therefore held consultations on the problem and have evolved a scheme, 
the object of which is to induce unemployed natives roaming about the 
streets in the various urban areas to accept employment outside such ur-
ban areas.” This is how the scheme was to work: henceforth, when black 
persons failed to produce a pass, they “were not taken to court but to labor 
bureaux where they would be induced or forced to volunteer.” In theo-
ry, they were to be told that if they “volunteered” for farm labor, charges 
against them would be dropped as an exchange. The result, the Commis-
sion noted, was that “arrests for failure to produce a pass became a rich 
source of labor for the farms,” ensuring the farmers “a cheap supply of 
labor.” But the category farm prisoners did not feature in the prison hear-
ings. Why not? Because, said the Commission, “nobody came forward to 
give evidence.” “Nobody” here presumably refers to the victims of the farm 
labor system; it could not possibly refer to its institutional managers since 
the Commission had the legal right to subpoena reluctant or even unwill-
ing witnesses, and had done so in other instances but, obviously, chose not 
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to do so in this and related cases.
Perhaps the most blatant exclusion from prison hearings was that 
of prisoners detained without trial. The number so detained between 1960 
and 1990 were estimated at “some 80,000 South Africans” by the Human 
Rights Committee, whose reports were made available to the Commission. 
In the words of the Human Rights Committee, as cited by the Commis-
sion: “There can be little doubt that the security police regard their ability 
to torture detainees with total impunity as the cornerstone of the deten-
tion system.” The most notorious instance of death in detention was that 
of Steve Biko. The Commission acknowledged the detention (and murder) 
of Steve Biko as a gross violation of human rights but not that of others. 
The Commission gave no legal reasons for excluding the category of de-
tainees from prison hearings. It simply did not have the time: “There were 
practical rather than legal reasons for excluding detention from the prison 
hearings.”
Anyone familiar with the contents of the five-volume Commission 
Report will testify that these volumes are a rich source of information on 
everyday apartheid and its practices. This was the work of the research 
staff of the Commission, which comprised mainly historians and social 
scientists. The evidence they accumulated, however, had to be filtered 
through legislated categories as interpreted by members of the Commis-
sion. Unlike researchers, these were drawn from two very different groups: 
religious leaders and members of the psychological profession. As a group, 
they were determined that both the confession and the reprieve had to be 
individual to be meaningful.
When the public outcry grew against the Commission’s decision to 
exclude from its hearings all violence that had targeted groups and com-
munities, the TRC responded by holding institutional hearings, but then 
specified that these were to clarify the background, the context, against 
which specific violations were committed. The Commission thus distin-
guished between structural and willed outcomes; the former reduced to 
“context” and “background” and the latter highlighted as evidence of agen-
cy. To make the point, it distinguished between “bodily integrity rights” 
and “subsistence rights”, individual and group rights and, political and 
non-political motivations — ruling that only politically motivated viola-
tions of bodily integrity (but not subsistence) rights and individual (but not 
group) rights fell within its legislative purview.
Why was the “enforced transfer of a person from one area to an-
other” a violation of a right over one’s person, but not the migrant labor 
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system that involved both coerced movement and coerced labor? If arson 
was defined as a gross violation, then why did not a similar destruction 
through bulldozing, a practice characteristic of forced removals, also count 
as a gross rights violation? Pass laws and forced removals, both targeting 
communities and not individuals, had been at the heart of the claim that 
apartheid was indeed a “crime against humanity”. But in the report of the 
Commission, both were reduced to “background” and “context.”
At the end, the Commission came up with three truly bizarre conclu-
sions. The first was a list of 20,000+ names of individuals it acknowledged 
as victims of gross violations of human rights. The TRC recommended only 
those — and not the millions of victims of pass law, forced removals and 
forced labor — to receive reparations from the post-apartheid state. Second, 
the Commission compiled a time series of violations over its mandate, 
which began with the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and closed with the 
first democratic elections in 1994. “Most violations,” the Commission con-
cluded, “took place in the period after the unbanning of political parties 
(1990-1994)” and that it was the result of conflict between anti-apartheid 
groups, especially the ANC and the IFP in Natal. The Commission then 
compiled a list of “perpetrator organisations.” From this followed the Com-
mission’s most scandalous conclusion. It identified the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP) as the top “perpetrator organization” and the ANC as the third 
in that notorious list of perpetrators. In contrast, the state security services 
came as runner-ups: the South African Police (SAP) second and the South 
African Defense Forces (SADF) trailing in fourth place.
How could the Commission arrive at these bizarre conclusions? To 
begin with, the Commission saw itself as working within the framework of 
the agreement reached at CODESA which included respecting the legality of 
apartheid. Second, the Commission did not even question the legitimacy 
of apartheid legislation that indemnified state operatives already indemni-
fied by the apartheid parliament through a series of laws, stretching from 
the Sharpeville massacre through the Soweto uprising to the end of apart-
heid. Scholars who have studied these indemnities estimate that the num-
bers indemnified between only 1990 and 1994 range anywhere between 
13,000 and 21,000. Contrast this with the 7,094 individuals, “the majority of 
whom were, in concrete terms, drawn from the ranks of liberation move-
ments.” If the TRC honored the indemnification granted by a whole series 
of indemnity jurisprudence which unfailingly followed on the heels of 
each human rights catastrophe under apartheid, then was the TRC left with 
no more than to complete the indemnification begun under apartheid, by 
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granting amnesty mainly to those in the liberation movements alleged to 
have committed human rights violations?
There were many debates inside the Commission, but only one mi-
nority view was appended to the Commission’s Report as a formal ex-
pression of dissent. This was penned under the name of Commissioner 
Wynand Malan. This is how Malan put his “main reservation”: “The Act 
does not put apartheid on trial. It accepts that apartheid has been convict-
ed by the negotiations at Kempton Park and executed by the adoption of 
our new Constitution. The Act charges the Commission to deal with gross 
human rights violations, with crimes both under apartheid law and present 
law” (italics mine). At the same time, Malan insisted that the Commission 
stay away from any reference to international law: “international law does 
not provide for the granting of amnesty for a crime against humanity.” Ma-
lan was the only one to state forthrightly the assumptions that made sense 
of the Commission’s work. My only problem was that he ascribed these to 
the Act, and not to the Commission’s interpretation of it.
Malan called for a shift from the plane of morality to that of history, 
and from a focus on the personal and the individual to one on community. 
In Malan’s words: “Slavery is a crime against humanity. Yet Paul, in his 
letters to the Ephesians and Colossians, is uncritical of the institution and 
discusses the duties of slaves and their masters. Given a different interna-
tional balance of power, colonialism too might have been found a crime 
against humanity.” Malan called on the Commission to put together a nar-
rative that would provide a foundation for national reconciliation: “If we 
can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims 
of the ultimate perpetrator — namely the conflict of the past, we will have 
fully achieved unity and reconciliation” Malan was right that recognizing 
victims and perpetrators of apartheid can only be the first step to recon-
ciliation. The next step would be to recognize both as survivors who must 
together shape a common future. Reconciliation cannot be between perpe-
trators and victims; it can only be between survivors.
The narrative the TRC crafted also had its political effects. Because the 
TRC focused on perpetrators and kept out of sight the beneficiaries of mass 
violations of rights — such as pass laws and forced expulsions — it allowed 
the vast majority of white South Africans to go away thinking that they 
had little to do with these atrocities. Indeed, most learnt nothing new. The 
alternative would have been for the TRC to educate white South Africans 
that no matter their political views — whether they were for, against or in-
different to apartheid, aware if its actions or not — they were all, without 
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exception, its beneficiaries, when it came to residential areas where they 
lived, the jobs they held, the schools they went to, the taxes they did or did 
not pay, the cheap labor they employed, and so on. Because the TRC was 
not a legislative organ, because its decisions — except on amnesty — did not 
have the force of law, the TRC did not face the same political restrictions as 
did the negotiators at Kempton Park. At the same time, the TRC had access 
to state resources and could reach right into South African living rooms at 
prime time. It needed to educate ordinary South Africans, black and white, 
about everyday apartheid and its impact on the life chances and circum-
stances of generations of South Africans. Such an education would have 
brought home to one and all the morality and the necessity of social justice. 
It would at least have educated them as to why the political reform that had 
brought them an end to juridical and political apartheid was unlikely to 
hold in the absence of social justice.
In the end, the TRC addressed itself to a tiny minority of South Afri-
cans, perpetrators and their victims, the former state operatives and the 
latter political activists. It ignored lived apartheid, which would have made 
sense of the lived experience of the vast majority of South Africans, lived 
apartheid. When it came to reconciliation, it addressed a small minority, 
the old and the new elite, but ignored the vast majority of the population.
In sum, the TRC set aside the distinctive everyday violence of apart-
heid, the violence that targeted entire groups and that was central to real-
izing its political agenda. This is because the TRC understood violence as 
criminal, not political; as driven by individual perpetrators, and not groups 
of beneficiaries; as targeting identifiable, individual victims, and not entire 
groups. It focused on violence as excess, not as norm. It thus limited the 
criminal responsibility of individual operatives to actions that exceeded 
political orders — actions that would have been defined as crimes under 
apartheid law. In doing so, the TRC distinguished between the violence of 
apartheid — pass laws, forced removals, and so on — and the excess violence 
of its operatives. Because it did so, it was unable to achieve even that which 
Nuremberg did: to compile a comprehensive record of the atrocities com-
mitted by the apartheid regime. This is why the TRC should be seen as a 
special court within the framework of apartheid law.
The TRC hoped to function as a surrogate Nuremberg by displacing 
the logic of crime and punishment with that of crime and confession. By 
linking confession to amnesty, the TRC attempted to subordinate the logic 
of criminal justice to that of political justice, but the attempt was not suc-
cessful. The TRC ended up trying to hold individual state officials criminal-
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ly responsible — but only for those actions that would have been defined as 
crimes under apartheid law. Put differently, it held them accountable for 
violence that infringed apartheid law, but not for violence that was enabled 
by apartheid law. It limited criminal responsibility to actions that would 
have been crimes under apartheid law. In doing so, it both upheld apart-
heid as a rule of law and the law that undergirded apartheid.
What could the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have done dif-
ferently in light of the fact that its work followed the agreement arrived at 
during the political negotiations known as CODESA? Instead of claiming 
to be laying the groundwork for “reconciliation,” it would, first of all, have 
openly acknowledged that the basis of reconciliation was arrived at in the 
political and legislative that proceeded and made possible its creation. To 
do so would be to acknowledge the possibilities open before it. Second, 
it would have turned its privileged and daily access to public resources 
and mass media to turn its public performance into a public education-
al campaign. The point of this campaign would be to frame the terms of 
post-apartheid discourse by center-staging the question of social justice, 
and thus going beyond identifying individual perpetrators and individu-
al victims to highlighting both beneficiaries and victims of apartheid as 
groups. To do this would have been to educate the white population about 
the structural horrors and social outcomes of apartheid as a mode of gov-
erning society — to make the argument that the political reconciliation of 
adversarial elites could only be made durable if followed by social recon-
ciliation of the population at large.
The TRC shared with Nuremberg a neoliberal understanding of jus-
tice, one that individualized it. Both were oriented to individual guilt even 
though one prioritized reconciliation, and the other prosecution. To stop 
here and to accent reconciliation over prosecution would be to accent im-
punity and lack of accountability. When it comes to reconciliation, it is not 
the TRC but CODESA that shows the way forward. Unless it is combined with 
reform, reconciliation is unlikely to last. To be durable, it needs to be joined 
to a protracted process of reform, not only political as with CODESA, but 
social, as the TRC had the opportunity to underline — but did not.
Lessons for Africa
Like the violence that marked apartheid South Africa, mass violence in Af-
rican countries is not the outcome of inter-state conflict; it is in most cases 
the product of civil wars. Does the end of apartheid offer a lesson for the 
rest of Africa?
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Both the TRC and CODESA were born of the internal situation in South 
Africa. If the TRC failed, it was not because of internal factors; rather, its 
shortcomings flowed from emulating a model defined by the global hu-
man rights regime: even if the TRC offered amnesty in place of punishment, 
it identified criminal responsibility with individual agents (‘perpetrators’) 
and presumed that they should be held individually accountable (‘criminal 
justice’). The choice is between a criminal process, whether in its mock 
version performed by the TRC or in the strict version promised by the ICC, 
and a CODESA-style political process. Neither the mock court-style process 
of the TRC, which organized informal hearings and offered amnesty in re-
turn for ‘truth,’ nor criminal trials offered by the ICC with the inevitable 
consequence that alleged perpetrators be politically disenfranchized, but 
the creation of a CODESA-type inclusive political process that would focus 
on the most contentious issues that offers a way forward for conflict-rid-
den African countries. What distinguished the political process was that 
its focus was neither perpetrators nor victims, but the contentious issues 
that have driven different cycles of violence. The process aimed to be inclu-
sive of all, whether perpetrators, victims, beneficiaries or bystanders. The 
object, too, was not to identify and punish (or forgive) perpetrators, but to 
reform the political community and make it more inclusive. If South Africa 
has a lesson to offer the rest of Africa, that lesson is not contained in the 
practices of the TRC, but those of CODESA.
The South African transition was not unique. It was preceded by the 
political settlement in Uganda at the end of the 1980-86 civil war, and fol-
lowed by the settlement in Mozambique. The outcome of the civil war in 
Uganda made for a political stalemate in a situation in which one side (the 
National Resistance Army) had ‘won’ militarily in a war waged in the Lu-
wero Triangle (a small part of the country), but lacked an organized polit-
ical presence in large sections of the country. Its political resolution was a 
power-sharing arrangement called the “broad base”, which gave positions 
in the cabinet to those opposition groups that agreed to renounce the use 
of arms even if not their political objectives.
In Mozambique, six months after the South African elections in 1994, 
there was another impressive settlement, which followed a 15-year civil war. 
Like CODESA, this settlement too renounced both the battlefield and the 
courts as two versions of a winner-take-all approach, unsuited to a conflict 
in which there was no winner. The peace process in Mozambique decrimi-
nalised Renamo, an insurgency aided and advised by the apartheid regime, 
whose practices included the recruitment of child soldiers and the mutila-
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tion of civilians. A retribution process in Mozambique would have meant 
no settlement at all; instead, Renamo’s leadership were brought into the po-
litical process and invited to run in national and local elections. The ‘broad 
base’ deal in Uganda, the South African transition and the postwar resolu-
tion in Mozambique were all achieved before the ICC came into existence.
Contrast this with the Ugandan government’s response to a post-1986 
insurgency by a string of groups, the last of these being the Lord’s Resist-
ance Army. Like Renamo in Mozambique, the LRA too kidnapped children 
and made of them child soldiers, and mutilated civilians as a regular prac-
tice. When the Ugandan parliament passed a resolution calling for a full 
amnesty to the leadership of the LRA, as a prelude to their participation in 
the political process, the presidency looked for a way to undercut it. Bent 
on punishing the civilian population he saw as having supported a string 
of insurgencies, the president turned to the International Criminal Court. 
The ICC willingly issued warrants against the leadership of the LRA leaders 
in 2005, a fact that effectively sabotaged the both the democratic process 
within the country and the overall peace process. The LRA moved across 
the border, at first to Congo and then to Central African Republic. Though 
a pale resemblance of its earlier self, the LRA continues to flicker as an 
insurgent force.
It is not accidental that all the examples I have cited above — the 
“broad base” in Uganda, the end of apartheid, and the end of the civil war 
in Mozambique — happened before the ICC was set up. In all three cases, 
the accent was on the “survivor,” not the “victim.” From this point of view, 
the survivor is not the victim who survived, but all who survived the civil 
war, whether victim, perpetrator or bystander. The way forward, I argue, 
lies not with “victims’ justice” but with a more inclusive notion of “survi-
vors’ justice.”
As with Nuremberg, victors’ justice and victims’ justice are not alter-
natives; they are two sides of the same coin. Victims’ justice is not possible 
without a victor who can set up a rule of law under which victims may ob-
tain justice. Criminal justice, like the military battlefield, is a place where 
there can only be winners and losers. It risks setting up the ground for 
the next war. As I shall argue in the next section, the pursuit of victims’ 
justice risks perpetuating the cycle of violence. For a more inclusive notion 
of justice — survivors’ justice — to be possible, one needs to shift focus from 
perpetrators to issues that drive the conflict.
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Nuremberg and the Contemporary  
Human Rights Movement
As interpreted by the human rights movement, the lesson of Nuremberg is 
two-fold: one, that responsibility for mass violence must be ascribed to in-
dividual agents; and, two, that criminal justice is the only politically viable 
and morally acceptable response to mass violence. Turned into the found-
ing moment of the new human rights movement, Nuremberg is today the 
model for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and is held as the fitting 
anti-dote to every incident of mass violence.
To de-ideologize Nuremberg is to recognize that the logic of Nurem-
berg flowed from the context of inter-state war, one that ended in victory 
for one side, which then put the losers on trial. The logic of a court trial is 
zero sum: you are either innocent or guilty. This kind of logic ill fits the con-
text of a civil war. Victims and perpetrators in civil wars often trade places 
in ongoing cycles of violence. No one is wholly innocent and none wholly 
guilty. Each side has a narrative of victimhood. Victims’ justice is the flip 
side of victors’ justice: both demonize the other side, and exclude it from 
participation in the new political order. A civil war can end up either as a 
renegotiated union or as a separation between states. The logic of Nurem-
berg drives parties in the civil war to the latter conclusion: military victory 
and the separation of yesterday’s perpetrators and victims into two sepa-
rate political communities. It is fitting to recall that the founding moment 
of the South African transition is not a criminal trial, but political negoti-
ations, CODESA, reflecting a radically different context: not a war between 
states, but civil war.
The contemporary human rights movement is permeated with the 
logic of Nuremberg. Human rights groups focus on atrocities for which 
they seek individual criminal responsibility. Their method of work has a 
formalized name: Naming and Shaming. The methodology involves a suc-
cession of clearly defined steps: catalogue atrocities, identify victims and 
perpetrators, name and shame the perpetrators, and demand that they be 
held criminally accountable. The underside of the focus on perpetrators 
is to downplay issues. Read the field reports of Human Rights Watch or 
International Crisis Group and you will find that, except for a pro-forma 
1-2 page introduction on history and context — the focus is on ‘naming and 
shaming’. Indeed, context is considered a distraction from establishing the 
universality of human rights.
This is problematic if one recognizes that political violence is often 
not a standalone incident but part of a cycle of violence — a fact obscured by 
MISR WP 23 Mamdani.indd   27 15/10/2015   09:23
28
the absence of a historical context. In a previous book on the Rwandan 
genocide, I set about constructing an historical account of the violence: 
the more I did so, the more I realized that victims and perpetrators tended 
to trade places. Where victims and perpetrators have traded places, each 
side has a narrative of victimhood. The more you downplay context, the 
more you tend to locate the motivation for violence in either the individual 
psychology of the perpetrator or the culture of a group of perpetrators. The 
tendency to portray the perpetrator as the driving force behind the vio-
lence leads to freezing the two identities, perpetrator and victim, leading 
to the assumption that the perpetrator is always the perpetrator and the 
victim is always the victim. The result is to demonize the agency of the per-
petrator — and diminish the agency of the victim. Demonizing goes along 
with branding, and reinforces the assumption that you can easily and eter-
nally separate the bad from the good. The more depoliticized our notion 
of violence, the more the temptation to think of violence as its own expla-
nation. Indeed, the tendency is to seek the explanation for violence in the 
person of the perpetrator. From being a problem, violence also becomes 
the solution. The temptation is to think that eliminating the perpetrator 
will solve the problem. But instead of showing a way out of the dilemma, 
violence introduces us to a quagmire. It feeds the cycle of violence.
Violence is not its own explanation. This much becomes clear with 
a shift of focus from human rights to human wrongs. Human rights may 
be universal, human wrongs are specific. To focus on human wrongs is, 
first, to highlight context. It is, second, to underline issues. And it is, third, 
to produce a narrative that highlights the cycle of violence. To break out 
of the cycle of violence we need to displace the victim narrative with that 
of the survivor. A survivor narrative is less perpetrator-driven, more is-
sue-driven. Atrocities become part of a historical narrative, no longer seen 
so many stand-alone acts but as parts of an ongoing cycle of violence. To 
acknowledge that victim and perpetrator have traded places is to accept 
that neither can be marked as a permanent identity. The consequence is to 
dedemonize — and thus to humanize — the perpetrator.
If Nuremberg has been ideologized as a paradigm, the end of apart-
heid has been exceptionalized as an improbable outcome produced by the 
exceptional personality of Nelson Mandela. But the lesson of South Africa 
is to look for the solution within the problem and not outside it. The point 
is to strive for internal reform, not external intervention. CODESA has a dou-
ble significance. CODESA focused on the cycle of violence as threatening the 
very foundation of a political community. It dared to reimagine the politi-
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cal community by recognizing in the aftereffects of violence an opportunity 
to refound the political community. In doing so, it underlines the need to 
return to an older tradition in political theory, one that stretches from Hob-
bes to Arendt and recognizes political violence — conquest, civil war — as 
potentially foundational to the creation of an inclusive political order.
On the negative side, CODESA — and the TRC — failed to acknowledge 
that this same violence has also been foundational to the establishment of 
a liberal socio-economic order. In the words of Marx, this extra-economic 
violence was key to primitive accumulation. To imagine a socio-economic 
order beyond liberalism is to focus on the question of social justice. The 
downside of the South African transition was its attempt to put a political 
lid on a public conversation about social justice in post-apartheid South 
Africa. It is arguable that the political balance of forces that shaped the 
post-apartheid transition also defined its limits, a limitation reflected in 
the fact that the transition was more political than social. This should have 
been all the more reason to expect a non-binding process like the TRC to 
make room for a discussion on social justice.
Neither victors’ justice nor victims’ justice, CODESA shed the zero-sum 
logic of criminal justice for the inclusive nature of political justice, inclu-
sion through the reform of the political community in which yesterday’s 
victims, perpetrators, bystanders and beneficiaries may participate as to-
day’s survivors. Political reform targets entire groups, not isolated individ-
uals. Its object is not punishment, but a change of rules; not state creation, 
but state reform. By turning its back on revenge, it offers the possibility of 
creating new communities of survivors. By focusing on the link between 
creating an inclusive political order and an inclusive rule of law, it calls for 
a deep reflection on the relation between politics and law. The point of it 
all was not to avenge the dead, but to give the living a second chance.
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